Retrograde at the Operational Level of War

ISBN: 1288316550

Author: Brant, Bruce A

Condition: New

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the doctrine of retrograde operations. Specifically, it answers the question: does current doctrine provide sufficient guidance for retrograde operations at the operational level of war? To answer the question the historical examples of the Germans'; Ardennes-Alsace Offensive of 1944 and the Chinese Communist Offensive of 1950 are analyzed. A comparison is made between the major operational problems found in each example and the published doctrine of that era. The evolution of retrograde doctrine after each conflict is also examined to observe if any changes occurred that were influenced by the previous experience. Current doctrine is compared to past doctrine as well as the problems encountered in the two examples. A conclusion is then made as to the adequacy of established retrograde doctrine. Five operational retrograde lessons were found in the historical examples. First, the operational commander must plan for retrograde and have a realistic criteria of when to execute it. Second, in a retrograde operation, gaining command and control over the forces involved is the first major problem of the commander. Third, retrograde operations may have significant political implications. Fourth, the civilian population may have great impact on retrograde operations. Finally, fire support assets need to be prioritized to the units conducting a retrograde. None of these lessons were found in any current doctrine. FM 100-5 Operations is the best source of retrograde doctrine but is not specific enough. It is recommended that an operational level manual be written with a specific section devoted to retrograde doctrine. Also, a better understanding of retrograde operations would occur if they were part of wargaming in the American military school system.